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MEASURING THE REACH OF TITLE IX: DEFINING
PROGRAM AND RECIPIENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION
by
JAMES H. BROOKS*
I. INTRODUCTION
P RESIDENTS OF PRIVATE COLLEGES and universities have argued strongly for
institutional autonomy, and in particular, freedom from federal govern-
ment regulation.' They assert that the government's role in forcing colleges
and universities to comply with specified social justice goals erodes established
concepts of academic freedom .2 This argument will be tested before the United
States Supreme Court during the 1983-84 term in the appeal of Grove City
College v. Bell, I where college officials assert that the Assurance of Compliance
form required by the Department of Education Title IX enforcement regulations'
violates first amendment rights of academic freedom and association.5
Grove City College also contends that (1) its programs and activities are
not subject to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19726 solely because
some of its students receive federal funds - Basic Educational Opportunity
(Pell) Grants7 and Guaranteed Student Loans (G.S.L.'s)l to be used to pay
educational expenses; (2) the college's entire operation is not subject to Title
IX regulations where the college itself receives no direct federal financial
assistance and exercises no control over governmental subsidies given to some
of its students; and (3) the Department of Education may not terminate direct
grants to students, without a finding of discrimination in a program receiving
federal financial assistance, solely because the college refuses to sign the
*Dean of Students and Adjunct Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research of Cyndi Woodbury, third year student at the J. Reuban Clark School of Law,
Brigham Young University and Barbara Becker, third year student at William Mitchell College of Law.
'See Oaks, A Private University Looks at Government Regulations, 4 J. COLL. & U.L. 1 (1976); Brewster,
The Report of the President (New Haven: Yale U., 1974-75), Bok, The Federal Government and the
University, 58 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 80 (1980).
'Edwards, Higher Education and the Unholy Crusade Against Government Regulation (Institute for
Educational Management, Harvard University, 1980) at 43.
3687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983).
'34 C.F.R. § 106.4(a) (1983). The regulation provides in pertinent part:
Every application for Federal financial assistance for any education program or activity shall as
condition of its approval contain or be accompanied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient,
satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary, that each education program or activity operated by the
applicant or recipient and to which this part applies will be operated in compliance with this part.
'Petitioner's Brief for a Writ of Certiorari, Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792 (1982).
'20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976).
720 U.S.C. § 1070 (1976).
120 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976).
[335] 1
Brooks: Title IX
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1984
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Assurance of Compliance form.9
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits, with certain
exceptions, discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance. 10 Pursuant to Congress' directive,"
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW, now the Depart-
ment of Education)'2 promulgated a comprehensive set of regulations to govern
the conduct of federally assisted schools in a number of specific areas.' 3
The Department of Education contends that "federal financial assistance"
includes direct and indirect assistance and that "programs and activities" receiv-
ing federal financial assistance includes any institution which receives "[f]ederal
financial assistance ... through another recipient . '"' The Department's
regulations define federal financial assistance as:
(i) A grant or loan of federal financial assistance, including funds
made available for:
(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any
entity for payment to or on behalf of students admitted to that entity,
or extended directly to such students for payment to that entity.' 5
The Department's regulations also define a "recipient" of federal financial
assistance as follows
(h) "Recipient" means.. . any person, to whom Federal financial
assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which
operates an education program or activity which receives or benefits from
such assistance, including any subunit, successor, assignee or transferee
thereof.' 6
Thus, the Department of Education maintains that Grove City College
is a "recipient" since students attending Grove City receive federal monies in
the form of Pell Grants, which are used to pay their expenses at Grove City
College.'
'Petitioner's Brief for a Writ of Certiorari, Grove City College v. Bell, No. 82-792.
"-20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
(a) Prohibition against discriminations; exceptions
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance, ...
"20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
220 U.S.C. § 3441 (Supp. V 1981).
"34 C.F.R. § 106 (1983).
"Grove City, 687 F.2d at 690. In its case before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Department of Education
modified its definition of program to include only the financial aid program at Grove City College although
it still maintained that its regulations were enforceable. See Respondent's Brief at 82-792.
"34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(1)(ii) (1983).
"Id. at § 106.2(h).
'"Grove City, 687 F.2d at 690. In the district court, the Department claimed that the availability of
Guaranteed Student Loans (GSL's) and Pell Grants made Grove City College a recipient of Federal financial
assistance and therefore subject to Title IX. The district court held that GSL's were contracts of guarantee
within the exception to Section 902(a). On appeal the Department did not contest the district court. See
also, Hillsdale College v. Department of HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 424 n.17 (6th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 17:3
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss3/1
Two main issues are raised by Grove City and will be analyzed in
this article. 8 First, should the Supreme Court construe a post-secondary
institution as a "program" for purposes of Title IX? Second, should aid to
students be considered federal financial assistance to the institution?
II. POST-SECONDARY INSTITUTION AS A "PROGRAM"
A. Ultra Vires Challenges
Central to the debate over the Department of Education's definition of
"program" is whether section 106.2 and similar sections are ultra vires.
The phrase "ultra vires," most commonly used in the law of corporations,
refers to attempts by a corporation to exercise powers it does not possess or
when, in the exercise of specifically designated powers, the corporation exceeds
the scope of those powers. 9 An act that the corporation has no power to per-
form is void.2" An act in excess of power is merely voidable if the parties can
be returned to the position they occupied before the act.21 When evaluating
the actions of a public corporation, a court must consider the original delega-
tion of powers and subsequent statutory modifications as well as the inten-
tions of the legislature before deciding whether an act was beyond the power
"Two secondary issues are also raised in Grove City: 1) can the Department of Education terminate aid
to students, absent a finding of discrimination, solely because an institution refuses to sign an Assurance
of Compliance?, and 2) does termination of aid to students because an institution does not comply with
Department regulations, violate the constitutional guarantee of free association?
The argument that termination of student aid is a violation of the right to free association was raised
in Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 606-07 (D.S.C. 1974), which involved a claim arising
under Title VI. The district court upheld the termination of almost $400,000 of assistance distributed among
221 students attending the university, stating that "Congress unquestionably has plenary authority to impose
such reasonable conditions on the use of granted funds or other assistance as it deems in the public interest."
In specific response to the free association claim, the court noted that the Constitution (via the Free Exercise
Clause) does not provide an absolute protection to invidious discrimination and that "courts have not
hesitated to reject the argument of free association as a defense to an otherwise valid civil rights action."
As the Supreme Court noted in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1977): Title IX,
like Title VI, was designed to "avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices .... "
This compelling government interest should override an attempt to shield discriminatory activity with the
constitutional umbrella of free association.
Termination of federal assistance, based on failure to execute an Assurance of Compliance, was upheld
in Gardner v. Alabama, 385 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1968); Approximately
one million dollars of federal assistance was terminated after the state of Alabama refused to sign the
Assurance form. Because actual discrimination was established in the record in Gardner, the opinion of
the case does not reach termination for refusal to sign an assurance as a "matter of conscience," when
no evidence of discrimination exists. However, the court of appeals in Grove City, 687 F.2d at 704, stated
that no evidence of actual discrimination is needed. Assuming that the regulations have been properly
enacted and reflect the intent of Congress, termination based upon failure to sign the Assurance of
Compliance form is within the authority of the Department and is, in addition, the only practical approach.
It is obvious that the resources of the Department are not adequate to conduct individual investigations
of the activities of all recipients of federal funds. Thus, "self-monitoring" via obtaining signatures on
the Assurance of Compliance becomes necessary. Without such an enforcement scheme, the Department
of Education would face an impossible burden in attempting to carry out its Congressional mandate to
ensure that federal funds are not used to subsidize discriminatory activities.
"People ex reL Barrett v. Bank of Peoria, 295 Ill. App. 543, 15 N.E.2d 333 (1938); McWilliams v. Central
States Life Insurance Co., 137 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
" Walton v. Albers, 313 Ill. App. 304, 40 N.E.2d 99 (1942); Causeway Inv. Co. v. Nass., Ill S.W.2d
703 (Tex. Comm. App. 1938).
"Highway Mut. Cas. Co. v. Stern, 306 Ill. App. 506, 29 N.E.2d 281 (1940).
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granted to the public corporation and thus, ultra vires.22
The ultra vires doctrine may also be applied to administrative agency
regulations.23 The Supreme Court has stated:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal
statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power
to make law - for no such power can be delegated by Congress - but
the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress
as expressed by the statute. A regulation which does not do this, but
operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.
And not only must a regulation, in order to be valid, be consistent with
the statute, but it must be reasonable.2"
Thus, in order to determine whether an administrative agency's regula-
tions are enforceable, a court must ascertain whether or not the agency ex-
ceeded its authority when drafting the regulations. As with public corporations,
the court will first look to the language of the legislative statute25 and then
to the legislative intent behind the statute.26 If the court concludes that the agency
has exceeded its authority, the regulations are ultra vires and therefore unen-
forceable. If the court concludes otherwise, the statute should stand.
B. Interpretation of the Statute
1. The Language of the Statute
On its face, Title IX appears to apply only to programs and activities within
post-secondary institutions that receive federal funding as individual units. 2
Yet a broader reading of "education program and activity" supports the con-
clusion that a single-campus college, a multi-campus university, or a state system
may be an education "program" within the meaning of the statute. Conse-
quently, many separate parts or activities could together comprise a "program."
Congress defined "educational institution" as:
any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any
institution of vocational, professional, or higher education, except that
in the case of an educational institution composed of more than one school,
college, or department which are administratively separate units such term
means each such school, college, or department. 2
"First Equity Corporation Fla. v. Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1975).
"See HEW's Regulation Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges,
1976 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 133 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Ultra Vires Challenges].
14Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) citation
omitted. See also, NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980); Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S.
68 (1965); Lynch v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U.S. 315 (1924).
"See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
"See Schmid v. United States, 436 F.2d 987, 989 (Ct. CI. 1971).
220 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1976).
2,Id.
[Vol. 17:3
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Congress failed, however, to define "education program or activity" and fur-
ther neglected to include the term "educational institution" in its basic pro-
hibition in section 1681(a) of the Education Amendments of 1972. Had the
term "educational institution" been introduced into the language of section
1681(a), the intent to include such units in whole or in part as programs within
the scope of Title IX would be clear.29
Two amendments dealing specifically with higher education institutions
were added to Title IX in 1974 and 1976. The wording of these two amend-
ments implies that Congress understood Title IX to apply broadly to higher
education. The 1974 amendment states in pertinent part: "[Title IX] shall not
apply to membership practices ... of a social fraternity or social sorority which
is exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of [Title 26], the active member-
ship of which consists primarily of students in attendance at an institution of
higher education .... ""
Congress was concerned enough about this exemption to make it retroac-
tive to July 1, 1972.' The amendment was unnecessary if Title IX was
understood to apply narrowly, i.e., only to specific programs within an institu-
tion. Fraternities and sororities are considered educational activities in the broad
sense of the term,32 and generally receive no direct federal financial assistance
but instead are funded almost exclusively by dues-paying members. Clearly,
Congress believed the amendment was necessary in order to exempt fraternities
and sororities from the otherwise broad reach of the term "program" under
Title IX.
The 1976 Amendment states in pertinent part:
[Title IX] shall not apply with respect to any scholarship or other finan-
cial assistance awarded by an institution of higher education to any in-
dividual because such individual has received such award in any pageant
in which the attainment of such award is based upon a combination of
factors related to the personal appearance, poise and talent of such in-
dividual and in which participation is limited to individuals of one sex
only, so long as such pageant is in compliance with other nondiscrimina-
tion provisions of Federal law.33
Here, Congress exempted higher education scholarships awarded in beauty
pageants from the restrictions of Title IX. Again, this amendment was un-
"The phrase "under any education program or activity conducted by an educational institution receiving
Federal financial assistance" would connote institution-wide compliance, while the phrase "under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance conducted by an educational institution"
would connote pinpoint program-specificity. This may have been an oversight since the language of Title
IX was copied almost verbatim from the language of Title VI. See 117 CONG. REc. 30,156 (1971).
3020 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6)(A) (1976).
"Pub. L. No. 93-568 § 3(b).
"See, e.g., City of Baltimore v. Poe, 224 Md. 428, 168 A.2d 193 (1961); See also 120 CONG. REc. 39,992-93
(1974) (Statement of Sen. Bayh).
"20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(9) (1976) (emphasis added).
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necessary if Congress understood Title IX to apply narrowly to education "pro-
grams." More significantly, Congress added the phrase "so long as such pageant
is in compliance with other nondiscrimination provisions of Federal law." This
language implies not only a broad approach to Title IX, but also to Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973"; both statutes are similar in wording to Title IX."
2. Legislative History
Courts and commentators alike have concluded that Title IX was patterned
after Title VI.37 Title VI was designed to eliminate racial discrimination in "any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," 3" while Title IX was
designed to eliminate sexual discrimination in education programs and
activities. 39 Senator Bayh first introduced the provisions embodying Title IX
as an amendment to S. 659, the Education Amendments of 1971 .40 The provi-
sion reads:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subject to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity conducted by a public institution of
higher education or any school or department of graduate education, which
is a recipient of federal financial assistance for any education program
or activity . .. .
Senator Bayh, concerned that women attain equal access to public higher
education, stated:
While racial discrimination has been explicitly prohibited for nearly 20
years, only a few months ago the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a
lower court decision upholding the constitutionality of a State's
maintenance of a branch of its public university system on a sexually
segregated basis...
How equal is educational opportunity when admissions brochures
for a State univerity can explicitly state - as one did recently:
"Admission of women on the freshmen level will be restricted to
3"42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
3529 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
3'See infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 23 and Note, Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University:
Defining "Recipient" and "Program or Part Thereof, " 78 MICH. L. REv. 608 (1980); See also Grove City,
687 F.2d 684; University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982); Haffer v. Temple Univ.,
524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981) appeal pending, No. 82-1049 (3d Cir. 1982).
3842 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
"See 117 CONG. REc. 30,412 (1971), Senator Bayh, the amendment's sponsor, stated that "[tihe bill deals
with equal access to education. Such access should not be denied because of poverty or sex. If we are
going to give all students an equal education, women must finally be guaranteed equal access to
education .... "
"S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), 117 CONG. REC. 30,500 (1971).
"117 CONG. REC. at 30,156 (1971) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 17:3
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those who are especially well qualified." '4 2
Senator Bayh was also concerned about the shortage of women employed at
higher professional levels, and therefore included the clause "or any school
or department of graduate education, which is a recipient of federal financial
assistance for any education program or activity" to ensure that women would
have an equal opportunity for graduate education.4'3 This proposed amend-
ment was meant to apply institution-wide, but it was defeated when the Senate
sustained a ruling by the Chair that the amendment was not germane.
In February 1972, Senator Bayh introduced a slightly modified version
of his original amendment that was ultimately adopted as Title IX.45 The Senator
concluded:
Many of the provisions of this amendment have been discussed on the
Senate floor in the past. Some have been passed by either the House or
the Senate.
... When I proposed an amendment similar to this last August it
was ruled "nongermane." Now I am coming back to the Senate with this
comprehensive approach which incorporates not only the key provisions
of my earlier amendment, but the strongest points of the antidiscrimination
amendments approved by the House. 6
In clarifying his proposed amendment, Senator Bayh explained:
As [Senator Pell] knows, we are dealing with three basically different
types of discrimination here. We are dealing with discrimination in ad-
mission to an institution, discrimination of available services or studies
within an institution once students are admitted, and discrimination in
employment within an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever.
In the area of employment, we permit no exceptions. In the area of
services, once a student is accepted within an institution, we permit no
exceptions. The Senator from Rhode Island asked about admissions policies
of private secondary and primary schools. They would be excepted.4 7
Senator Bayh's statement that the amendment is intended to eliminate
discrimination in available services or studies "within an institution once students
are admitted" goes beyond the scope of services and studies that receive direct
federal assistance themselves. He adds the caveat, "we permit no exceptions,"
implying that no available services or studies within an institution are exempt
from Title IX.
"Id. at 30,155-56 (1971).
"4Id. at 30,156 (1971).
"Id. at 30,481-85 (1971).
"'See 118 CONG. REC. 5802-03 (1972).
41Id. at 5805. See supra notes 40-44.
"Id. at 5812. The quote is taken from a discussion between Senator Bayh and Senator Pell, Chairman
of the Senate Subcommittee on Education and Floor Manager of the Eudcation Bill of which Title IX
was an amendment. Bayh responded to Pel's inquiry about the scope of sections which in large part became
§ 901(a) and (b) (emphasis added).
Winter, 19841 TITLE IX
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Post-enactment legislative history provides additional evidence that Title
IX was to be applied institution-wide."8 In June 1974, HEW published pro-
posed regulations pursuant to Congress' mandate.4 9 In June, 1975 HEW publish-
ed its final Title IX regulations" and, as required by section 431(d)(1) of the
General Education Provisions Act,' 1 submitted the regulations to Congress for
review. 52
Resolutions of disapproval were introduced in both houses of Congress.
In the Senate, Senator Helms introduced a resolution that constituted a blanket
disapproval of the regulations:5 3
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That
pursuant to the provisions of Section 431(d) of the General Education
Provisions Act, the Congress of the United States finds that the regula-
tions of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare relating to
non-discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs and activities
receiving or benefiting from Federal financial assistance are inconsistent
with the provisions of title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. . . , and disapproves such regulations which were transmitted to
the Congress on June 3, 1975.1"
The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee had jurisdiction over
the Helms concurrent resolution. Senator Javits, ranking Republican on that
committee, told Senator Helms during floor debate that the Committee planned
to act on his resolution. 5 However, the Committee took no action on the matter.
In the House, Representative Martin introduced a broad disapproval
resolution,5 6 which failed to pass." The HEW regulations went into effect, un-
changed by Congress, on July 21, 1975. On the same day that the HEW regula-
"The Supreme Court gave post-enactment legislative history a great deal of credence as it related to Congress'
intent that Title IX encompass employment discrimination in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512 (1982). Certainly, there are problems with post-enactment history that make it less persuasive than
pre-enactment history; nevertheless, it should be entered into the legislative intent equation. See Ultra
Vires Challenges, supra note 23.
"See supra note 11, and 39 Fed. Reg. 22, 228 (1974).
"40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
"20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1976).
"This "laying before" provision is designed to afford Congress an opportunity to examine a regulation
and, if it is found inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its authority, to disapprove it in a concurrent
resolution. If no such disapproval resolution is adopted within 45 days, the regulation becomes effective.
See, Cotter & Smith, Administrative Accountability to Congress: The Concurrent Resolution, 9 WESTERN
POL. Q. 955 (1956); J.P. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 204-38 (1964).
"S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 17,300 (1975); See also 121 CONG. REC. 19,874
(1975) (Statement of Sen. Helms). Senator Laxalt introduced a resolution disapproving the sections regulating
athletic programs. S. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 22,940 (1975). The Senate took
non action on the matter.
"121 CONG. REC. 17,301 (1975) (citations omitted).
"Sec. 33 CONG. Q. 1298 (1975). Senator Laxalt's resolution suffered the same fate; See supra note 53.
"H.R. Con. Res. 310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); See CONG. REC. 19,209 (1975) Representative Martin
also introduced H.R. Con. Res. 311 dealing with athletics. See 121 CONG. REc. 19,209 (1975).
"
7 See supra note 53.
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tions took effect, Senator Helms introduced a bill to amend Title IX." The
section pertinent to this discussion reads:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, this section shall apply only
to education programs and activities which directly receive financial
assistance from the Federal Government. For the purposes of this
paragraph, "education programs and activities" means only programs
and activities which are an integral part of the required curriculum of an
educational institution subject to this title."9
The Helms bill was not reported out of committee.
One year later, Senator McClure introduced two amendments, one of which
defined education programs and activities as "such programs or activities as
are curriculum or graduation requirements of the institutions defined .... "60
Senator Bayh's objection to these amendments further illustrates Congress'
intent in legislating Title IX:
I think it would be a tragic departure from the whole concept of pro-
viding quality education to take the amendment.
It is my understanding that the Senator's amendment will exempt
any courses not required for graduation from the purview of title IX. The
impact of this amendment is enormous - it would exempt those areas
of traditional discrimination against women that are the reason for the
Congressional enactment of title IX. These areas would include scholar-
ship aid, employment and employment benefits and extracurricular
activities such as athletics.'
Senator McClure's amendment was defeated on the floor of the Senate by a
fifty-two to twenty-eight margin.
61
Although the language of Title IX does not specifically define "educa-
tion program or activity," a close reading of the subsequent 1974 and 1976
amendments, coupled with the testimony of Title IX's chief sponsor (Senator
Bayh) prior to and subsequent to adoption, supports the conclusion that the
Department of Education's regulations interpreting "education program and
activity" are not inconsistent with Congressional intent. Furthermore, neither
house of Congress has, to date, succeeded in passing any legislation that would
modify or nullify the Department's definitions. Consequently, the regulations
are not ultra vires.
'IS. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See 121 CONG. REC. 23,845 (1975).
"1121 CONG. REC. 23,847 (1975) (emphasis added).
"Amend. 389, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 122 CONG. REc. 28,136 (1976). The second amendment defined
federal financial assistance received as "assistance received by the institution directly from the Federal
government." Amend. 390, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 122 CONG. REC. 28,144 (1976). See infra notes
159-63 and accompanying text.
"122 CONG. REC. 28,144 (1976).
"Id. at 28,147.
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3. Judicial Interpretation
Court opinions fall on both sides of the question of whether a post-
secondary institution can be considered a "program" under Title IX. Courts
uniformly agree that the statutory language is vague and confusing. Most deci-
sions, therefore, rely upon legislative history as judges and justices interpret
it, and on Title IX's close parallels with Title VI and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
a. Judicial Views of Title IX Legislative History
One of the most extensive discussions of Title IX legislative history comes
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Grove City
College v. Bell. 3 Judge Garth, speaking for a unanimous court, said:
As we understand these legislative concerns, the legislators did not con-
template that separate, discrete, and distinct components or functions of
an integrated educational institution would be regarded as the individual
programs, to which [Title IX] refer[s]. Whatever the legislators did con-
template by their use of the term "program and activity" we can be cer-
tain on only two things: (1) "program or activity" was never intended
to be defined in the narrow and restrictive manner urged by Grove; and
(2) the precise meaning, content, and parameters of "program" as it ap-
plies to the issue presented here have never been established.6 '
In Haffer v. Temple University" women students brought an action against
Temple University alleging discrimination in the operation of its intercollegiate
athletic program. Temple claimed that its athletic program was beyond the scope
of Title IX since it is not a program that receives federal funds. 6 In finding
for the plaintiffs, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania made the following conclusion based upon a review of the
legislative history: "I have found nothing in the legislative history reflecting
a Congressional intent to limit the scope of the general statement of prohibi-
tion to programs receiving earmarked federal funds. Instead, the opposite in-
tention appears from the repeated defeats [in Congress] of precisely the limited
view Temple now advocates. '" 7 These courts, and others that have adopted
an "institutional approach" to Title IX, have relied upon pre- and post-
enactment legislative history consistent with the analysis presented earlier in
this article.68
Other courts have taken a pin-point program approach after an incomplete
analysis of the statute's legislative history. The leading case adopting the nar-
"Grove City, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
64Id. at 697.
"1524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
16Id. at 533.
6Id. at 535.
"Grove City, 687 F.2d at 691-95; Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 533-36.
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row view of "program" is Hillsdale College v. Department of Health, Educa-
tion & Welfare.69
In Hillsdale, HEW sought an order terminating financial assistance received
by students enrolled at Hillsdale College. Although the court recognized that
the college was a "recipient" under Title IX and that funds could be terminated
without an actual finding of discrimination, it held the regulations authoriz-
ing termination of funds for failure to sign the Assurance of Compliance
invalid." Judge Brown, speaking for the majority of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, concluded "we find that the legislative histor[y]
of . . .Title IX reveal[s] no indication that Congress contemplated that an
entire educational institution could constitute a single 'program or activity.' '".
However, Chief Judge Edwards registered a vigorous dissent. After an exten-
sive discussion of the historical struggle of women for equal rights in the United
States, he stated that the broad remedial purpose of the statute and the benefits
derived by Hillsdale College as a whole from the aid to its students justified
termination of aid for failure to sign the Assurance of Compliance.72 Hillsdale
is currently on appeal.73
The majority opinion is based upon an analysis of the legislative history
of Title IX that is incomplete. The court first cites Senator Bayh's amendment
as originally proposed and compares its language with the adopted 1972
amendment."'
[The 1971 proposed] amendment embodied an institutional approach as
it would regulate all operations of an educational institution which received
federal assistance for any of its programs or activities .... In February,
1972 the provision ultimately enacted as Title IX was introduced ....
The institutional approach . ..was replaced by the program-specific
language presently contained in Sections 901 and 902. No explanation or
discussion was given for the change of approach.75
This interpretation is incorrect in two respects. First, the amendment as
originally proposed would have regulated all operations of a public institution
of higher education or any school or department of graduate education that
is a recipient of federal financial assistance.76 Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit
erroneously concluded that all undergraduate programs at private post-secondary
institutions would have been covered in the 1971 proposed amendment. The
"1696 F.2d 418(6th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. Mar. 16, 1983) (No. 82-1538).
"Id. at 430.
"Id. at 427. See supra notes 39-45.
"Id. at 436-37 (Edward, C.J., dissenting).
"Hillsdale, 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982) petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. Mar. 16, 1983)
(No. 82-1538).
"Id. at 426.
"Id. (emphasis added in final sentence).
"See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Sixth Circuit's decision in Hillsdale characterizes the proposed amendment as
much more sweeping than it actually was.
Second, the court apparently did not consider Senator Bayh's remarks,
when introducing the 1972 amendments, that no available services or studies
within an institution are exempt from Title IX. Clearly, Bayh's comments point
to a more expansive interpretation of "program" than the Sixth Circuit
conceded.77 It is not surprising, therefore, that the court concluded, based on
an erroneous and incomplete analysis of legislative history, that Congress in-
tended a narrow "program" approach in the 1972 amendment.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that "the term 'program' was used in the Con-
gressional debates preceding passage of Title IX 'to refer not to the total pro-
gram of an educational institution but to smaller-scale activities within the in-
stitution.' "'I The court based this conclusion in part on a dialogue between
Representatives Waggoner (Louisiana) and Steiger (Wisconsin) and Represen-
tative Green (Oregon), the author and floor manager in the House of the
measure (Title X) that eventually became incorporated in Title IX.79
Mr. WAGGONER: Let me clarify a little bit better the point I am trying
to make and that is [Title X] applies, apparently, only to those programs
wherein the Federal Government is in part or in whole financing a pro-
gram or an activity?
Mrs. GREEN: With Federal funds.
Mr. WAGGONER: That is what I mean, Federal funds.
Mrs. GREEN: It is really the same as the Civil Rights Act in terms of
race ....
Mr. STEIGER: Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words, and I rise in support of the amendment. Mr. Chairman, let me
proceed along the line of the gentleman from Louisiana, and let me ask
the gentlewoman from Oregon [Mrs. GREEN] for clarification on what
I thought I heard.
In title X the gentleman from Louisiana asked relating to a program
or activities receiving Federal financial assistance, and under the "pro-
gram or activity" one could not discriminate. That is not to be read, am
I correct, that it is limited in terms of its application, that is, title X, to
only programs that are federally financed? For example, are we saying
that if in the English department they receive no funds from the Federal
Government that therefore that program is exempt?80
Representative Steiger asked two questions above. It is clear from the fact that
he was a supporter of the amendment that he asked the first in the negative
"See supra notes 39-45.
"Hillsdale, 696 F.2d at 427 (quoting Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 23, at 181).
11117 CONG. REC. 39,256 (1971).
soId.
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as a rhetorical question. But he asked a second question, apparently for clarifica-
tion. Although Representative Green's response may appear unclear, it would
seem that she is responding to Representative Steiger's first question:
Mrs. GREEN: If the gentleman will yield, the answer is in the affirmative.
Enforcement is limited to each entity or institution and to each program
and activity. Discrimination would cut off all program funds within an
institution."
The dialogue which follows clarifies Representative Green's response as inten-
ding an institutional interpretation for "program" in Title X.
Mr. STEIGER: So that the effect of Title X is to, in effect, go across
the board in terms of the cutting off of funds to an institution that would
discriminate, is that correct?
Mrs. GREEN: The purpose of title X is to end discrimination in all in-
stitutions of higer education, yes, across the board .... 11
Consequently, the Sixth Circuit incorrectly concluded that the term "program"
was intended to refer to "smaller-scale activities within the institution."
83
The Hillsdale court relied heavily on program-specific conclusions in
Bennett v. West Texas State University," a case alleging denial of equal oppor-
tunity in the University's intercollegiate athletic program. Yet, the district court's
review of Title IX legislative history in Bennett consists of a one paragraph
comparison of the 1971 proposed amendment with Title IX.85 Moreover, Bennett
was reversed without opinion by the Fifth Circuit and is currently on appeal.8"
Contrary to the conclusions reached in the Hillsdale and Bennett cases,
the courts which have extensively reviewed the legislative history of Title IX
favor adoption of an institutional approach in defining "program."
b. Court Interpretations of Title VI and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973
i. Title VI
The leading case supporting the application of an institutional approach
"Id. (emphasis supplied).
821d.
"Hillsdale, 696 F.2d at 427.
"525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Texas 1981), rev'd. mem. 698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983).
"Id. at 79. See also Rice v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338 (1st Cir. 1981)
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980);
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1382-83 (E.D Mich. 1981). All of these cases either
do not discuss the legislative history or do so in insufficient detail to draw accurate conclusions. The Supreme
Court dealt with "program" in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). North Haven
was an employment discrimination case and the Supreme Court spent a great deal of discussion and analysis
on the legislative history behind employment discrimination proscriptions in Title IX, than on trying to
define "program."
1"698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983).
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to Title VI is Bob Jones University v. Johnson.7 An administrative law judge
had terminated the rights of eligible veterans attending Bob Jones University
from receiving veterans' educational benefits because the University had failed
to comply with Title VI. s At the time of the decision, Bob Jones University
was a religious institution that forbade intermarriage of the races, denied ad-
mission to unmarried non-whites, and expelled students who dated members
of another race. 9
In upholding the termination of federal funds, the district court implied
that "program" under Title VI could have two meanings - individual pro-
grams within the institution, and Bob Jones' entire education program: "[t]he
participation of veterans who - but for the availability of federal funds -
would not enter the educational programs of the approved school, benefits
the school by enlarging the pool of qualified applicants upon which it can draw
for its educational program.9
The court drew the following conclusion from its analysis of Title VI
legislative history: "Since the VA payments to veterans are conditioned upon
participation in an approved program of education, it is relevant to the Con-
gressional purpose to ensure that such programs be conducted on a non-
discriminatory basis so that no eligible veteran is excluded from participation." 9'
Bob Jones University has since had its tax exempt status revoked by the
Internal Revenue Service because of its racially discriminatory practices and
governmental policy against subsidizing racial discrimination in education.92
In its comments accompanying its final Title IX regulations,93 HEW cited
another case, Board of Public Instruction v. Finch.9" From 1965 to 1968, a
segregated Florida school district and HEW engaged in negotiations in an effort
to arrive at an acceptable desegregation plan for the school district. Progress
toward desegregation was slow; finally, HEW broke off negotiations as fruitless
and commenced administrative proceedings under Title VI. A HEW hearing
examiner found that the school district's progress toward desegregation was
inadequate and entered an order terminating any federal financial assistance
administered by HEW, the National Science Foundation, and the Department
of the Interior until such time as the school district corrected its noncompliance
with the Act. The HEW Reviewing Authority adopted this order.95
"396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974) aff'd. mem. 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
"Id. at 598.
"Id. at 600.
"Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 604 (some emphasis added).
9Bob Jones v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 4593, 4594 (U.S. May 24, 1983).
340 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
9414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
"Id. at 1070-71.
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Although ruling that individual programs within an institution can be
separated for the purposes of terminating federal funds, the court added a word
of caution:
In finding that a termination of funds under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act must be made on a program by program basis, we do not mean
to indicate that a program must be considered in isolation from its con-
text .... In deference to that possibility, the administrative agency seeking
to cut off federal funds must make findings of fact indicating either that
a particular program is itself administered in a discriminatory manner,
or is so affected by discriminatory practices elsewhere in the school system
that it thereby becomes discriminatory."6
This reasoning presumes that there are instances where individual programs
within an institution cannot be separated from the broader educational mission
of the institution.
The United States Supreme Court took an institutional approach to Title
VI in Lau v. Nichols." In Lau, the Court reviewed the challenge of Chinese-
speaking students to the San Francisco school district's failure to provide bi-
lingual training for a substantial proportion of its students who could speak
only Chinese. In deciding for the students, the Court referred to "the educa-
tional program" of the school district;9" Justice Stewart's concurring opinion
also approved HEW's Title VI guidelines and referred to "the educational pro-
gram offered by a school district. '"99 As shown by the cases cited, the institu-
tional definition of "program" has gained wide acceptance by courts inter-
preting Title VI. Since the wording of the Title IX prohibition is parallel to
that found in Title VI, judicial interpretation of both should be parallel.
ii. Section 504
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 00 contains language similar
to that of Title IX, but pertains to "otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividuals." Therefore, it is useful to examine how the courts have interpreted
"program" in Section 504 decisions. Recognizing that Section 504 contains
little legislative history, the courts have assigned their own interpretation to
the term "program." 10' They have consistently applied Section 504 to all
available programs and activities within an institution that receives federal finan-
"Id. at 1078-79.
"1414 U.S. 563 (1974).
"Id. at 568.
99d. at 570. See also Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967).
029 U.S.C. § 794 which reads "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual... as defined in section
[706(7) of this Title], shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fimancial
assistance."
"'See, e.g., Wright v. Columbia University, 520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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cial assistance.' °2
Columbia University challenged an expansive interpretation of "program"
in Wright v. Columbia University, 03 claiming that its football program received
no direct federal funding and therefore was outside the coverage of Section
504.14 The district court judge ruled that a major university is not made up
of discrete entities, but rather each entity is a part of the broader educational
program. 105 The Wright court also concluded that Columbia University view-
ed itself as a singular institution, not as "a composite of discrete entities."
0 6
Clearly, Columbia has consistently represented to the plaintiff that
the University as a whole, not the limited athletic program, was the official
decisionmaker ....
[T]he Section obviously applies to the University, which made the
ultimate decision. Consequently, if plaintiff was the victim of discrimina-
tion based upon his handicap, the University, not the athletic program,
is the party responsible therefor.' 07
It is far more feasible for a large university like Columbia than it is for a small
single-campus college to argue that it is composed of distinct programs. 08 Yet
the district court concluded that the component parts of any college or univer-
sity are so interrelated that to define only one part as a "program receiving
federal financial assistance" is impractical and runs counter to the purpose
of the statute.' 9 Further, such definitions would allow schools to use federal
dollars in nondiscriminatory programs, while at the same time channelling the
money released by federal funds into discriminatory programs within the school.
This "shell game" approach would effectively circumvent the Congressional
intent behind such remedial legislation as Title VI, Section 504, and Title IX.
There is ample evidence to support this "component parts" theory of higher
education; e.g., that a higher education institution is comprised of component
parts that interact with one another in some direct or indirect way."0 Indeed,
at most universitites, budget approval for all academic and extra-curricular pro-
grams comes from a single office, either that of the President or the Treasurer,
"'See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Camenisch v. University of Texas,
616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1981); Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Poole v.
South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.J. 1980); Borden v. Rohr, No. 75-844 (S.D. Ohio
1975); Suemnick v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n., No. 4-70592 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
013520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
1Id. at 791.
"'Id. at 792.
16Id"
l1Id. See also, Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. at 951.
"'For instance, a large university is made up of separate schools or colleges, each headed by a separate
dean. A small college would not have this arrangement.
"1'520 F. Supp. at 792.
1 'See J. BRUBACHER& & W. RUDY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN TRANSITION: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES (3d ed. 1976); K. MORTIMER & T. McCONNEL, SHARING AUTHORITY EFFECTIVELY (1978).
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with final approval by a Board of Trustees or Board of Regents. I II Decision-
making processes are shared between individual department chairpersons or
directors and their deans."I2 Some courts have termed this "infection,"II arguing
that discrimination in one part of the institution may "infect" several or even
all parts of that institution. This analysis has been applied by the courts to
the language of Title IX, its legislative history, and to interpretations of Title
VI and Section 504.
Neither the language of Title IX nor its accompanying legislative history
precludes a college or university, as a whole, from being an "education pro-
gram." The fact that Congress defined "educational institution" does not
necessarily mean that it did not intend for the total "education program" of
a post-secondary institution to be one species of program under Title IX, par-
ticularly when its individual entities are interrelated. In order for the Depart-
ment of Education regulations that broadly define "program" to be ruled ultra
vires and therefore unenforceable, a court would have to determine that the
Department went beyond its authority in promulgating the regulations. There
clearly is not a sufficient basis for such a claim. Indeed, Congress declined
to alter the Department of Education regulations despite the fact that several
opportunities were available to do so. Resolutions disapproving the regulations
were raised in both the House and the Senate; the Senate resolution failed to
reach a floor vote while the House resolution was defeated. Two amendments
to Title IX were unsuccessfully raised in the Senate that would have defined
"education program" narrowly - one dying in committee and the other voted
down by almost a two to one margin. In addition, the Department's regula-
tions are supported by a number of courts which have applied an institutional
approach to the definition of "program" in interpreting Title IX, as well as
by courts which have analyzed the definition of "program" under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore,
the Department's definition of "program," as promulgated in its regulations,
should be accepted by the Supreme Court.
III. DEFINITION OF "RECIPIENT"
Although closely related to the "program" definition, the "recipient" issue
can be discussed independently. Regardless of how the Supreme Court ultimately
defines "program," it will still need to decide whether indirect aid constitutes
"federal financial assistance."'' 4
The Department of Education's argument in support of its definition of
"recipient" centers around the infection theory. When a college or university
"'See, e.g., Berry & Buchwald, Enforcement of College Trustees' Fiduciary Duties: Students and the
Problems of Standing, 99 U.S.F.L. REV. 1 (1974).
"See, e.g., Hornby, Delegating Authority to the Community of Scholars, 1975 DUKE L.J. 279.
"'Florida v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078 (5th Cir. 1969).
"'The Supreme Court failed to define "program" in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
102 S. Ct. at 1927 (1982).
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receives federal financial assistance all of its component programs benefit either
directly or indirectly. I" In order to draw a final conclusion on the issue of federal
assistance, two questions must be answered. First, must the federal aid be receiv-
ed directly by a specific program or activity within an institution for discrimina-
tion to be prohibited in that activity? Second, can aid to a student be con-
sidered aid to the institution?
A. Direct vs. Indirect Assistance
1. The Language of the Statute
The prohibition in Section 1681 of the Education Amendments of 1972
gives little guidance as to the nature of aid in a "program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance"" because Congress failed to define "federal finan-
cial assistance." Further confounding the issue is the fund termination clause
found in Section 1682. 17 Should the fund recipient fail to comply with Title
IX, the Department of Education may, under certain conditions, terminate
or refuse to grant or continue assistance,
[biut such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political
entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has
been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program,
or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found." 8
Supporters of the direct assistance position, that is, that Title IX applies only
to institutional programs that receive direct federal financial assistance and not
to all activities within an institution, cite the language of this fund termination
clause to support their position."19
Yet the phrase "or part thereof" suggests that the fund termination clause
should be interpreted more narrowly than Section 1681. Fund termination is
a drastic step and, if initiated, should pinpoint the activity in which discrimina-
tion occurred. The prerequisites for fund termination specified in Section 1682
support this interpretation.' 0 However, this should not prevent subjecting
activities receiving indirect aid to Title IX scrutiny in accordance with the
remedial purpose of the statute.
"'40 Fed Reg. 24,128 (1975).
"'See supra note 10.
1'120 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
1 'Id.
"'See, e.g., Grove City, 687 F.2d 284; Haffer, 524 F. Supp. 531; supra note 37.
.220 U.S.C. § 1682 reads in pertinent part:
Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned
has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and
has determined that compliance cannnot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action
terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a
requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall
file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program
or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and grounds for such action. No
such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
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2. Legislative History
Pre-enactment legislative history does not address the specific question
of the meaning of "recipient." Post-enactment history, however, offers some
guidance as to legislative intent. Various members of Congress attempted to
exempt intercollegiate athletics from Title IX coverage. Athletics is one activity
that universally receives no direct federal financial assistance. Therefore, athletics
is a good area to test in order to determine whether Congress intended indirect
aid to be considered in the determination of the applicability of Title IX.
Two attempts to exclude intercollegiate athletics from the coverage of
Title IX failed."'2 Senator Tower introduced an amendment, defeated in Com-
mittee, to exclude revenue-producing intercollegiate athletic activities from Title
IX.I2 He re-introduced the amendment in 1975 and it was again defeated, this
time by the full Senate. 3
3. Judicial Interpretation of Title IX
It is not surprising that judicial opinions concerning the infection theory
are split along the same lines as the judicial definitions of "program." The
courts which have defined an entire institution as an educational program have
concluded that federal funds earmarked for a specific activity benefit all parts
of an institution.
In Haffer v. Temple University,"" for example, the University alleged that
since its athletic program received no direct federal funding, athletics were
exempt from Title IX - even though other parts of the university received
Federal financial assistance. 25 The court did not agree:
If Congress had not intended Title IX to cover indirectly funded
athletic programs, the intense media and congressional scrutiny of the
regulations on athletics should have led to a congressional resolution of
disapproval. But it did not.'2 6
A university ... cannot use federal money to support one graduate
program, such as the law school, run that program in perfect compliance
with Title VI or Title IX, transfer nonfederal money from the law school
budget to the budget of another program, such as the medical school,
and deny blacks or women admission to the medical school. 2 '
"'See supra notes 53-56, and accompanying text.
"'Amend. 1343, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 120 CONG. REC. 15,322 (1974).
"2S. 2106, 121 CONG. REC. 22,775 (1975).
"'Haffer, 524 F. Supp. 531.
'1Id. at 538.
111Id. at 536.
M'id. at 538. See also Todd, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination
in Public Schools, 53 TEx. L. REv. 103, 112; Grove City College, 687 F.2d at 698-99.
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The trial court in Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Hufstedler28 went one
step further with the infection theory. It concluded that activities such as single-
sex honor societies, which were
once removed from direct federal assistance, still must comply with Title
IX because it is useful and necessary to the effectuation of 20 U.S.C. §
1681, which demands an end to federal governmental support of the
perpetuation of discrimination against women in an educational institu-
tion. Sexually discriminatory honor societies significantly assisted by
federally supported universities perpetuate sexual discrimination. Thus,
Congress' authorization ... was not exceeded by H.E.W. [regulations]
which reach organizations that do not directly receive federal support. 29
Here the court took for granted that federal financial assistance permeated the
entire university and that any assistance from the university to the student
organization was indirect federal assistance. The decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's holding has been vacated by the
Supreme Court as moot. 3 '
Some courts do not accept the infection theory. In Othen v. Ann Arbor
School Board,131 the plaintiff alleged that his daughter was unjustly "cut" from
the high school golf team because of her sex. 32 The district court tied together
its definition of "program" with its interpretation of "recipient," to wit:
Congress intended to make a distinction between an institutional
approach and a programmatic approach. The precise, selective use of the
terms "programs" and "recipient" throughout the various section of Title
IX evidences a clear intent to have Sections 1681 and 1682, and the regula-
tions thereunder, apply only to specific educational programs or activities
which receive direct federal financial assistance.'33
Despite the confidence of the Othen court, Congress' use of "programs"
and "recipients" is far from precise. 3 , The court noted that it considered the
amount in controversy to be de minimus, a factor that may have led it to a
less than thorough investigation of Title IX legislative history.'35 Moreover,
121499 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd, in Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 445 (5th
Cir. 1981).
"'Id. at 503.
"Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Hufstedler, 52 U.S.L.W. 3384 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1983), vacating as moot 449
F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
'1507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981), appealed on other grounds 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983).
"Id. at 1378.
'"Id. at 1382 (emphasis added). See also Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1033
(E.D. Mich. 1977) aff'd 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
'"Bennett, 525 F. Supp. 77, relies heavily on the conclusions developed in Othen. See, e.g., 525 F. Supp.
77, 79. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed Bennett without opinion, 698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983).
"'Othen, 507 F. Supp. at 1390. In Othen, the amount of federal funds received by the district in 1979
amounted to twelve-one hundredths of one percent of the total budget. The court concluded that "[tihis
de minimus percentage of the district's total operating budget cannot form the basis for invocation of
Title IX." Id. It would be difficult for the Department of Education to determine on a case by case basis
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the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reviewing the district court's ruling, stated
that it was unnecessary for the district court to decide whether the athletic pro-
grams were subject to Title IX because the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed
all claims for relief except a request for attorneys' fees.' 3 6
Nonetheless, a similar link between "program" and "recipient" was drawn
by the district court in University of Richmond v. Bell,'3' in which Judge
Warriner concluded:
Were the court to adopt Plaintiff's argument, the programmatic instruc-
tion of Title IX would be rendered nugatory, because every program
activity at the university would be subject to Title IX .... In order for
the strictures of Title IX to be triggered, the federal financial assistance
must be direct .... The type of indirect aid received by the University
athletic program does not bring them within the ambit of Title IX. 38
Judge Warriner's comments seem to directly contradict legislative intent, as
indicated by the failure of Congress to adopt either of the two proposed amend-
ments that would have expressly excluded athletic programs from the reach
of Title IX.'"
Post-enactment legislative history, as well as the Haffer and Iron Arrow
opinions, are persuasive authority for adopting a broad approach in subjec-
ting education programs to Title IX scrutiny.
4. Judicial Interpretation of Title VI and Section 504
Two cases, both decided in 1976, are at odds on the indirect aid analysis
in the Title VI context. In Stewart v. New York University" ° the court reason-
ed that a $625,000 federal loan for the construction of a law school dormitory
did not subject the admissions procedure to Title VI. "[T]he indebtedness to
H.U.D. with respect to... the Law School dormitory, does not help the plain-
tiff, since the discrimination alleged here does not involve [the dormitory] but
rather the minority admissions policy.'" 4
As in Othen, the Stewart court considered the amount of aid involved to
be de minimus. ,2 However, the district court in Flanagan v. President and
whether student aid has a significant impact upon the operation of the college. It is generally conceded
that no such impact test is needed to measure direct aid. The prohibition in § 1681 is against sexual
discrimination in any education program or activity which receives federal financial assistance. It seems
inappropriate, therefore, to impose the de minimus test upon indirect aid.
"'Othen, 699 F.2d at 312.
'543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
"'Id. at 329.
"'The Richmond court relied heavily on conclusions developed in Othen and Bennett.
'"430 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
"MId. at 1314; Cf Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967); McGlotten v. Connally,
338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970).
"'Stewart, 430 F. Supp. at 1312.
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Directors of Georgetown College' 3 criticized the Stewart court's reasoning,
stating that "[t]his 'pinpoint' approach is ostensibly based on § 602 of Title
VI, ... which provides that compliance with Title VI may be effected by the
termination of such program or activity in which discrimination is found." I4 4
The court concluded that "by accepting federal financial assistance for the con-
struction of the Law Center, Georgetown and the Law Center were required
to refrain from discrimination on the basis of race in providing any service,
financial aid or other benefits to its Law Center students."' 4'5
Other Section 504 decisions have come down squarely for the inclusion
of indirect aid. In Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education,16 Judge
Ackerman found it
absurd to ban discrimination in a discrete area of a school system that
receives federal funds while permitting it throughout the rest of the system.
I do not believe that Congress intended to ban discrimination during school
hours while permitting it in officially sponsored extracurricular activities.
This belief is supported by the fact that federal aid to any program in
a school system releases local money for other uses, thereby benefiting
those programs that are not direct beneficiaries of federal aid.' 7
In Wright,' 8 Judge Troutman used the same reasoning:
To the extent that the University receives federal funding, component
entities thereof benefit indirectly through the reallocation of funds received
from other sources. Moreover, to accept defendant's argument would allow
major institutions receiving substantial amounts of federal aid to dissect
themselves, at whim, into discrete entities, to allocate federal dollars into
programs which cannot discriminate against handicapped persons, and
to free privately obtained funds from those programs and instead to
channel such money into programs purportedly immune from Section 504
strictures. Columbia's construction of Section 504 would sanction this cir-
cumvention of federal policy against discrimination for institutions
benefiting from federal aid. 14 9
Understandably, the courts that conclude that the institution as a whole
can comprise an education "program" also conclude that federal aid to one
component is aid to the total program. At the very least, each education pro-
gram within a system or institution must be viewed as interrelated, since fun-
417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976).
'4Id. at 383.
"'Id. at 384. See also Bob Jones, 396 F. Supp. at 602-03.
146490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
W"Id. at 95. It should also be noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400 (1979), applied § 504 to a nursing Program in a school receiving federal funds
without inquiry into whether the nursing program itself received direct federal moneys.
1'"520 F. Supp. 789.
"'Id. at 792.
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ding for a single program releases funds for use by other programs. Thus, the
courts that broadly define "recipient" and "program" conclude that no pro-
gram within an institution can be administered in a discriminatory manner if
any program in that institution receives direct federal funding.
Those who oppose the institutional approach in defining "program" cite
the language in the fund termination clause, arguing that "program" should
be defined as narrowly as possible to include only direct aid since only direct
aid should be terminated.' 11 However, this approach does not seem to recognize
the remedial purpose behind the enactment of Title IX.
B. Aid to Students Benefits the Institution
The remaining issue relating to the Department of Education's definition
of "recipient" is whether, under Title IX, federal aid to the students that enroll
at an institution constitutes aid to the institution itself.
1. Nature of the Aid
The aid in question in the Grove City College case is a Pell Grant. The
Pell Grant was established as the Basic Educational Opportunities Grant (BEOG)
appropriated by Congress and allocated by the Department of Education pur-
suant to 20 U.S.C. § 1070a. Under Department regulations, a student receives
money through either the Regular Disbursement System'"' or the Alternate
Disbursement System. '52
Through the Regular Disbursement System, the Secretary of Education
enters into an agreement with an institution of higher education under which
the institution calculates and pays Pell Grants to its students." 3 From time to
time, the Secretary advances funds for each award year to each institution,
based upon the estimate of the institution's need for funds to pay Pell Grants
to its students.'5
If a college elects the Alternate Disbursement System, the Secretary of
Education will calculate and pay the Pell Grant directly to the student.' " This
system requires the institution to verify that the student is an eligible recipient. 56
"'See, e.g., Note, The Program-Specific Reach of Title IX, 83 COL. L. REV. 1210 (1983).
"'34 C.F. R. § 690.71 (1983).
15id. at § 690.91.
1'd. at § 690.72.
"1Id. at § 690.74.
1'd. at § 690.92.
-561d. at § 690.94.
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Under either system, the student must sign the following statement:
Statement of Educational Purpose
I declare that I will use any funds I receive under the Pell Grant pro-
gram solely for expenses connected with attendance at
(Name of Institution)
(Date)
(Signature)'
A student retains eligiblity if he or she remains in good standing in an
undergraduate program. 58
2. Legislative History
While pre-enactment discussion is vague and does not specifically speak
to the types of funds that federal financial assistance may encompass, it is quite
clear from post-enactment legislative action that the Senate intended to include
student aid.
In 1976, Senator McClure proposed a second amendment to Title IX which
provided that "[flor the purposes of this chapter, federal financial assistance
received means assistance received by the institution directly from the federal
government.'"I 9
Senator McClure made it very clear what the intended effect of his pro-
posed amendment should be.
We seek in this instance, in the amendment that I have here,...
to limit that overreach by saying in this amendment that you cannot exert
Federal control over an institution where the institution does not take
Federal money directly, but the only Federal involvement is the aid that
a student may get. HEW regulations seek to exercise control over colleges
which have no more connection... or no Federal-aid programs directly
to the college or university at all, but who may, as a matter of hap-
penstance, have a veteran student who is going to school under the GI
bill, or some student who has some kind of grant from some Federal pro-
gram who is a student at that college, which then will subject the college
to Federal control and Federal regulation.1 6 1
Senator Pell's remarks in response to the McClure amendment illustrate how
far-reaching the Congress intended Title IX to be:
[T]o my mind,... the enactment of this amendment would mean
that no funds under the basic grant program would be covered by title IX.
While these dollars are paid to students they flow through and
ultimately go to institutions of higher education, and I do not believe that
"'Id. at § 690.79.
"Id. at § 690.94.
'9122 CONG. REC. 28,144 (1976).
"'Id. at 28,145.
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we should take the position that these Federalfunds can be used to further
discrimination based on sex. '
6 1
Senator Bayh concurred:
If a student is benefited, the school is benefited. It is not new law;
it is traditional, and I think in this instance it is a pretty fundamental tradi-
tion, that we treat all institutions alike as far as requiring them to meet
a standrd of educational opportunity equal for all of their students.'
62
The McClure amendment was defeated by a fifty to thirty margin on the same
day that it was introduced.'
63
3. Court Interpretation
After discussing the defeat of the amendment designed to limit the defini-
tion of federal assistance to direct aid only, the Third Circuit in Grove City
drew the following conclusion:
[W]here the Department's interpretation of "federal financial
assistance" has been directly brought to Congress' attention, Congress'
specific rejection of proposed legislation that would have overturned that
interpretation provides a substantial indication that it was Congress' in-
tent to include BEOG's [Pell Grants] within the coverage of [Title IX]. 161
Even the Sixth Circuit in Hillsdale admitted that although it felt that Title
IX was program-specific, it also felt that the college was a recipient of the aid
to its students. 16s Chief Judge Edwards, in his dissent, criticized the program-
specific nature of the majority opinion and concurred that funds given to
students for paying expenses while matriculating at an institution of higher
education benefit the institution itself: "[it seems clear to me that each of these
[studen aid] programs provides funds which when paid to the college are used
for the general support of the educational program of the college as a whole.'1 66
Only one court has argued that aid to students is not aid to the institution.' 67
The district court in University of Richmond v. Bell,' 61 stated that "[the Univer-
sity of Richmond] provides numerous programs, activities and services for which
it receives remuneration from its students. Thus the fees paid are compensa-
tion for services rendered and as such do not constitute 'aid'.' 6 9
16Id.
1621d.
1'61d. at 28,148.
'"Grove City, 687 F.2d at 695. See also Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 540.
"'Hillsdale, 697 F.2d at 424. See also Rice, 663 F.2d at 339.
"'Hillsdale, 697 F.2d at 434.
"'The employement discrimination cases in higher education decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in North Haven do not address the question of student aid. See, e.g., Seattle University v. HEW, 621
F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2264 (1982); Junior College District of St. Louis v. Califano,
597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 172 (1979).
1'543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
6'Id. at 330.
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The court's argument is unconvincing in two respects. First, student aid
is provided to an individual for the sole purpose of attending a post-secondary
institution. Should a student terminate his or her matriculation at some college
or university, he or she will cease to receive the funding. Second, to remain
consistent with the "services rendered" approach, most federal research grants
and government contracts with higher education institutions would have to be
exempted from Title IX restrictions, since the college or university is providing
a service to the federal government in exchange for funds. 70 Yet it is quite
clear that this line of reasoning contravenes the express language of Section
901 which proscribes discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance.
In analogous Title VI litigation, the court in Bob Jones University v.
Johnson7' deduced two ways in which Veteran's Administration benefits aided
Bob Jones University.
First, payments to veterans enrolled at approved schools serve to
defray the costs of the educational program of the schools thereby releasing
institutional funds which would, in the absence of federal assistance, be
spent on the student ....
A second reason supporting the proposition that Bob Jones receives
federal assistance is that the participation of veterans who - but for the
availability of federal funds - would not enter the educational programs
of the approved school, benefits the school by enlarging the pool of
qualified applicants upon which it can draw for its educational program. 72
By and large, all courts that have dealt with the issue agree that student aid
flows ultimately from the federal government to the institution. Even in Univer-
sity of Richmond the court recognized that at least some part of a college or
university is aided by this influx of federal monies.17
The determination of whether the Department of Education's definition
of "recipient" is ultra vires lies in the court's assessment of the nature of stu-
dent aid and the validity of the infection theory. The mistake perpetuated by
many lower courts is to make judgments based upon a misunderstanding of
the nature of student aid' and an over-reliance upon the fund termination
clause.' 5 A careful reading of Congress' intended purpose for student aid in
higher education yields the conclusion that federal assistance was never intended
to support discrimination in education. 7 6
3' See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1221d; 20 U.S.C. § 3051.
"396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974).
"'Id. at 603. See supra note 78; contra Stewart, 430 F. Supp. at 1314.
"'University of Richmond, 543 F. Supp. at 328.
"'See id. at 321.
"'See Grove City, 687 F.2d 684; Haffer, 524 F. Supp. 631.
"'6See, e.g., supra note 61 and accompanying text.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:3
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss3/1
Congress' continued application of Title IX to collegiate athletics supports
the notion that indirect aid can constitute "federal financial assistance" and
lends credence to the infection theory.'77 Many courts have been offended by
the argument that major institutions can, "at whim," divide themselves into
discrete entities for the sole purpose of rationalizing discrimination. '78
As with the Department of Education's definition of "program," there
is not a sufficient basis for the claim that the Department went beyond its
authority in promulgating its Title IX regulations related to "recipient."
Therefore, the Department's definition of recipient should be accepted by the
Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear from a thorough analysis of legislative history and post-
enactment Congressional debate that the Department of Education's defini-
tions of "program" and "recipient" under Title IX are not ultra vires. Courts
that have thoroughly analyzed Congressional intent have consistently upheld
the enforceability of the Department's Title IX regulations. Parallel Title VI
and Section 504 legislation has also been interpreted as supporting an institution-
wide approach to the meaning of "education program" and as justifying the
inclusion of student financial aid as "federal financial assistance" to a college
or university.
A narrow definition of "education program" assumes that an educational
institution can be divided into distinct, unrelated parts. A close reading of the
1974 and 1976 amendments to Title IX together with the remarks of Title IX's
chief sponsor supports the conclusion that Congress never intended a narrow
definition of "education program." Moreover, both the House and the Senate
have defeated all resolutions and amendments that would define "program"
narrowly. The correct perception seems to be that a college's "education pro-
gram" is made up of interrelated parts that are centrally managed.
An understanding of a higher education institution's administration is also
central to the concept of "federal financial assistance." Because of the fiscal
control that top-level college administrations exercise over institutional affairs,
it does not matter whether federal aid flows from a student to a college that
discriminates or whether funds can be moved from one activity to another with
discrimination as the result. The effect is the same as if funds were given directly
for a discriminatory purpose. Pell grants, for example, are given to qualified
students who pay to enroll in undergraduate academic programs. Federal aid
that benefits a student ultimately benefits the school in which he or she is
enrolled. Furthermore, the defeat of repeated attempts to exempt collegiate
athletics from Title IX implies that Congress intended indirect aid to be con-
sidered "federal financial assistance."
"'See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 15,322 (1974).
"'See, e.g., Wright, 520 F. Supp. at 792.
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In adopting Title IX, Congress attempted to provide both sexes with the
same quality of opportunity to pursue higher education. Private universities
and colleges have resisted federal government regulations, however, a narrow
view of the applicability of Title IX would subvert the Congressional intent
in providing federal aid to assist students in meeting their educational goals.
Title IX must apply to both public and private institutions if it is to effectuate
its goal of eliminating sexual discrimination in higher education programs.
EDITOR'S NOTE: On February 28, 1984, subsequent to the submission of
this article, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion on Grove City
College v. Bell. '" Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court, with all nine
justices concurring that Title IX coverage was triggered because some of the
college's students received Pell grants to pay for their education. The Court
concluded that Title IX coverage was not foreclosed merely because federal
funds were granted to the students rather than to the college's educational pro-
grams, basing its conclusion on,
the structure of the Education Amendments of 1972, the clear statutory
language, the legislative history (including post-enactment history) show-
ing Congress' awareness that the student assistant programs established
by the Amendments significantly aided colleges and universities, and the
longstanding administrative construction of the phrase "receiving Federal
financial assistance" as including assistance to a student who uses it at
a particular institution, ... 111
The Court further held that refusing to execute a proper Assurance of
Compliance warrants the Department of Education's termination of federal
assistance to the student financial aid program'I' and that there is no infringe-
ment of first amendment rights when a college is required to comply with the
prohibition of discrimination of Title IX as a condition of its continued eligiblity
to participate in the Pell program.'8 2
However, the majority of the Court also held that the receipt of Pell Grants
did not trigger institution-wide coverage under Title IX. " In purpose and effect,
Pell Grants represented financial assistance to the college's own financial aid
program and it is that program which may properly be regulated under Title
IX's non-discrimination provision. The fact that federal funds may eventually
reach the college's general operating budget could not subject it to institution-
wide coverage.' 8 Justice White stated, "we have found no persuasive evidence
7'104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984).
'"Id. at 1213 (Court's Syllabus).
..Id. at 1222.
1'Id. at 1223.
"'Id. at 1222. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented from this portion of the decision.
.841d.
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suggesting that Congress intended the Department's regulatory authority follow
federally aided students from classroom to classroom, building to building,
or activity to activity."' 83
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall in partial dissent,' 86 stated
that program specific language in Title IX was designed to insure that the reach
of the statute is dependent upon the scope of federal financial assistance pro-
vided to an institution. Justice Brennan stated,
When that financial assistance is clearly intended to serve as federal
aid for the entire institution, the institution as a whole should be covered
by the statute's prohibition of sex discrimination. Any other interpreta-
tion clearly disregards the intent of Congress and severly weakens the added
discrimination provisions included in Title IX. '
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, stated that the program specificity issue
was not in dispute and therefore needed not be decided but that,
a factual inquiry is nevertheless necessary as to which of Grove City's
programs and activities can be said to receive or benefit from financial
assistance .... Until we know something about the character of the par-
ticular program, it is inappropriate to give advice about an issue that is
not before us. "
Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, in Justice
Powell's concurrence, chastised the Department of Education for "having taken
a small independent college, which it acknowledges has engaged no discrimina-
tion whatever, through six years of litigation with the full weight of the federal
government opposing it.' ' 189
1651d.
"'Id. at 1226 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
"'Id. at 1237.
"'Id. at 1225 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"'Id. at 1224 (Powell, J., concurring).
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